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THE VODAFONE ESSAR DISPUTE: INADEQUATE TAX
PRINCIPLES CREATE DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR INDIA
Geoffrey T. Loomer*
Although the internationaltaxationsystem is not new to problems and crises,
economic liberalizationand the increasingintegrationof world markets has
intensifiedits difficulties, with MNEs being at theforefront of tax avoidance by

takingadvantageofloosely co-ordinatedinternationaltax treaties.The threatis
worrisomeenoughfor emerging economies such as Indiaand Chinato take notice,
despite theirearlierstance ofregardingforeigninvestment as a boom, regardlessof
tax contributions.This articletakes a specificexample in the case of the Vodafone
Essartax dispute regardingthe payment ofcapitalgains tax on the transferofa
controllinginterest in an Indian entityfrom one foreign company to another,in
orderto illustratethe loopholes in Indian tax law, the choice that is presentbefore
Indian courts-a choicebetween abidingby the principlesofinternationaltaxation
or changingIndian tax policy altogether,and a view on the way international
taxation agreements are to be read in lightof the norms ofinternationaltaxation.
I.

INTRODUCTION
..............................
A. THE FORM AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAx
B. THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

.......................

C. OUTLINE OF ARTICLE

II.

m.

IV.

............ 90
....................... 90

.........................

...................................................

91
93

THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE ................ 94
A. INDIAN ECONOMIC EXPANSION, TAX TREATIES AND THE ROLE OF MAURITIUS ....... 94
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE VODAFONE EssAR TRANSACTION ........................
96
C. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN ISSUES IN DISPUTE .................................
97
WHAT IS THE APPARENT EXTENT OF INDIA'S JURISDICTION
TO TAX CAPITAL GAINS?
.......................
............ 98
A. GENERAL COIMENIS ON JURISDICTION TO TAx .............................
98
B. DEEMED INCOME OF NON-RESIDENTS UNDER INDIAN DOMESTIC LAW ................. 100
C. POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF THE INDIA-MAURITIUs DTC .........
.......... 106
WHAT SHOULD BE THE EXTENT OF INDIA'S JURISDICTION TO TAX
CAPITAL GAINS?
.............. ..................
111
111....
A. LEGAL LIMITATIONs v. POLICY OrrIONs

V.

SYSTEM

..............................

B. WORLDWIDE FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT AS A POLICY OPTION ........................
C. MORE MODEST POLICY OroNs .........................................
CONCLUSION
............................................

111

112
114

115

Research Fellow, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, SaYd Business
School, Oxford.
89

Vol. 21(1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2009

1. INTRODUCTION
A. The Form and Flexibility ofthe InternationalTax System
It hardly needs repeating that the existing international tax system,
designed to allocate countries' taxing rights over income from bilateral trade and
investment, struggles under the weight of global economic integration. The
evolution of transnational trade and investment, particularly within
multinational enterprises [hereinafter "MNEs"J, raises difficult tax policy issues
that sovereign States have attempted to address through their domestic tax
regimes and their respective networks of double taxation conventions [hereinafter
"DTCs" or "tax treaties"]. This collection of policy responses has produced an
international tax consensus which Avi-Yonah aptly describes as a "flawed miracle" 1
The system functioned reasonably well in an economic environment characterized
by independent, single-state enterprises carrying on business abroad through
branch operations or carrying out transactions with unrelated foreign enterprises
- to the extent that such an environment ever existed. However, recent
liberalization of State economies and transnational integration of businesses,
assisted by advances in communication and transportation, disturb the foundations
upon which the international tax system is based.2 It is increasingly evident that
the fractures in the system are felt by both developed and developing nations.
There is a tendency to think of the problems related to international taxation,
and particularly international corporate taxation, as being recent. However, they
have troubled policy-makers since at least the late 1 9 th century. The period
between the World Wars in particular saw an unprecedented expansion of
international business and a corresponding crisis in international taxation, to
which the initial model DTCs were a response. In 1992, several years before
electronic commerce became a worldwide norm, Picciotto described the state of
the then-current international tax regime as an "increasing crisis" which was in
need of a "new approach".! As he observed at the time, much of this crisis has to do
with the creation and manipulation of offshore Statehood by internationally
integrated firms; the well-advised MNE is able to exploit the loosely coordinated
tax treaty system, often through the use of tax haven intermediaries, in order to
R. S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of InternationalTaxation: A Proposalfor Simplification, 74
TEx. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996).
2

Two of the best critiques, addressed in further detail in

§

IV below, are: K. Vogel,

Worldwide vs Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments
(Parts I-III), 8-9 INTERTAx 216 (1988), 10 INTERTAX 310 (1988), 11 INTERTAx 393 (1988), and
M.J. Graetz, The David R Tillinghast Lecture - Taxing International Income: Inadequate
3

Principles,Outdated Concepts, and UnsatisfactoryPolicies, 54 TAx. L. REV. 261 (2001).
E. SELIGMAN, EssAYs IN TAXATION ch 4 (MacMillan 1925), H. Wurzel, ForeignInvestment
and ExtraterritorialTaxation, 38 COLuM. L. REV. 809 (1938).
S. PicCIorro, INTERNATIONAL BUSL\ESs TAxATION: A STUDY IN THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
BUSINEss REGULATION 67-68 (Quorum Books, 1992).
90
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minimize its worldwide tax burden.5 This behaviour, although considered by
some to be unethical or at least undesirable, is entirely legal in the context of
prevailing international tax principles - what might be called the customary
norms of international taxation. These principles or norms include residencebased taxation, source-based taxation, permanent establishment, separate entity
accounting and, more fundamentally, separate corporate personality.'
Various tax administrations are nonetheless continuing to mount aggressive
challenges to international tax minimization structures that rely upon, or stretch
the boundaries of, these principles or norms. It is fair to say that, while issues related
to selective establishment in tax havens and selective reliance on treaty networks
are not new, it is only recently that governments have come to regard such issues as
socio-political rather than merely technical.' Efforts to thwart international tax
avoidance are by no means restricted to highly developed States, including the
member States of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
[hereinafter "OECD"]. Large emerging economies such as India, China and Brazil,
who may have previously welcomed the benefits of foreign investment without
regard to tax contribution, are now rightly concerned that profitable investments
by non-residents should bear a "fair share" of taxation in the host country.8 The
difficulty faced by any State is ascertaining and pursuing the fair and legally appropriate
tax burden within the constraints imposed by the international tax system.
B. The Indian Experience
It is well known that India has experienced remarkable economic growth
in the last decade. Massive increases in foreign investment, with the associated
corporate restructuring activity, have forced the Indian Income Tax Department
[hereinafter "ITD"] to grapple with and respond to complex international tax
issues. The theme of recent challenges brought by the ITD is the preservation or
amplification of India's tax jurisdiction as a source/host State.' Among other claims,
the ITD has argued that low thresholds should apply for treating local activities
of non-resident enterprises - including liaison offices and business process
Id., at 134-39. For a more recent exposition, see S. Picciotto, Tackling Tax Havens and

"Offshore" Finance, (Transnational Institute Conference Paper, Money Laundering,
Tax Evasion and Financial Regulation 2007), available at http://www.tni.org/crimedocs/picciotto.pdf.
6

R.S. Avi-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX ASINTERNATrONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIs OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TAx REGIME (Cambridge University Press 2007).
Picciorro 2007, supra note 5, at 1-2; The report by G. B. Oxfam, Tax Havens: Releasing
The Hidden Billions For Poverty Eradication (Oxfam Policy Paper, 2000), available at
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/oxfam-paper-_final-version__06_00.pdf
has helped raise the visibility of these issues in the United Kingdom.

A. Schindel &A. Atchabahian, Source and Residence: New Configurationof Their Principles
90a CDFI (Int'l Fiscal Association Congress, General Report, 2005).

S. Chakrabarti & R. Joseph, Permanent Establishment and Income Attribution in India,
TAX NOTES INT'L 517
INT'L 886 (2008).

(2008); K.A. Parillo, Will BureaucracyHinderIndia'sRise?, TAx NOrES
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outsourcing - as taxable permanent establishments under domestic law and
applicable tax treaties, that certain profits arising in India should attract
withholding tax as royalties or "fees for technical services", and that changes in
ownership of Indian companies should attract capital gains taxation.
This article discusses a recent challenge falling into the last of those
categories. The dispute turns on the proposition that Indian capital gains tax was
exigible on a transaction which in broad terms involved one non-resident
company, Hong Kong-based Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited
[hereinafter "HTI"], transferring to a second non-resident company, UK-based
Vodafone Group plc [hereinafter "Vodafone"], an indirect controlling interest in
the Indian company Hutchison Essar Limited10 [hereinafter "TelCo"]. The relevant
TelCo shares were held via a corporate structure designed to benefit from the tax
treaty between India and Mauritius." The ITD alleges that Vodafone should have
withheld approximately US$ 2 billion in capital gains tax from the consideration
paid to HTI and further alleges that Vodafone is liable for US$ 2 billion in penalties,
plus interest, for its failure to withhold and remit such tax. The case proceeded to
the Bombay High Court and was heard in June and July 2008. At the time this
article was written (October-November, 2008) the High Court had not yet issued
its decision. After writing but prior to publication, the High Court dismissed
Vodafone's petition, primarily on procedural grounds.12 The Court also made various
wide-ranging comments adopted from the respondents' submissions, all of which
must be considered obiterdicta, suggesting that the transaction was taxable in India
because it represented a transfer of a "controlling interest" in an Indian enterprise
from one "group ofcompanies" to another.'3 While the author sympathizes with this
suggestion, he considers it legally untenable for the reasons discussed herein. In
any event, the dispute is expected to be appealed to the Supreme Court of India.14
10

11

12

Hutchison Essar Limited was marketed as "Hutch" The name has been changed
to Vodafone Essar Limited. To avoid confusion among the shareholders it is referred
to herein as TelCo.
Convention Between The Government of The Republic of India and The
Government of Mauritius for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, IndiaMauritius, 1983 [hereinafter the "India-Mauritius DTC"].
Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India and another, Writ Petition
No. 2550 of 2007 (Dec. 3, 2008) [hereinafter the "Petition Judgment"]. The High
Court held that Vodafone was required to follow a prescribed dispute resolution

procedure for challenging the Show Cause Notice issued by the ITD, rather than

IS
1

attacking the legality of the Notice via petition. It held that the alleged chargeability
of the transaction to tax and the alleged duty to deduct tax at source involved
difficult questions of fact and law which could only be resolved through the proper
administrative framework ('1 170-85).
Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India and another, Writ Petition
No. 2550 of 2007 (Dec. 3, 2008), at 1 152-68.
If the Supreme Court overrules the High Court and concludes that the Notice was
patently illegal, that is likely to be the end of the matter. Alternatively, if the Supreme
92
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This is widely regarded as a landmark case for two reasons. First, the
decision will influence, if not determine, the outcome in a number of related
disputes, said to involve dispositions of Indian interests by the likes of AT&T
and General Electric." In each case, the ITD is advancing the view that a change
in the ultimate ownership of an Indian company by virtue of a transfer of shares
in an offshore holding entity is a disposition giving rise to a taxable capital gain
in India. More generally, the decision is significant because it will shape the legal
environment for foreign corporate investment in India.
C. Outline ofArticle
This article begins by briefly reviewing the economic and legal context in
which the Vodafone Essar tax dispute arose. It then focuses on the central feature of
the dispute, which has practical and theoretical implications within and beyond
India. This is the contention that a State's jurisdiction to tax capital gains might be
framed in such a way that a gain from a disposition, which is formally an alienation
of shares situated in a foreign State, is nonetheless taxable as a gain arising or accruing
from the underlying shares or assets in the source/host State (in this case, India). An
associated proposition is that tax treaty benefits relieving a foreign enterprise from
source-State taxation, specifically capital gains taxation, may be denied where the
treaty is considered to have been abused by residents of third States. Acceding to
either contention requires a State to "pierce the corporateveil", disregarding the separate
personality and distinct residence of companies in a corporate group.
The author is not an expert in the domestic tax law of India. Accordingly,
the intent of this article is not to investigate what the Indian Supreme Court will
decide based on a thorough analysis of the Income Tax Act, 1961 [hereinafter the
"Act"] and the relevant judicial precedents. Instead, the focus is on the relevant
principles of international tax law that are engaged. Some insights are offered on
the apparent scope of the Act, notably section 9, and the relevant provisions of
the India-Mauritius DTC, notably Article 13. In the author's opinion, while it is
highly unlikely that an Indian Court, having regard to these provisions, would
conclude the transaction was taxable in India, it is worth recognizing that this
dispute presents a broader policy choice for India. The overall question is whether
the judiciary will endorse and abide by international tax norms, thereby
vindicating certain international tax minimization structures, or will deviate
from such norms in order to counter what the ITD sees as unacceptable tax
avoidance. This is a choice between: on the one hand, legal certainty and
international coherence, perhaps at the expense of an equitable allocation of
Court agrees that Vodafone is required to follow a prescribed dispute resolution
15

procedure, it may be some time before either Court rules definitively on the
merits of the dispute.
See J. Leahy, Vodafone Tax Battle Set to Reach Supreme Court,FINANCIAL TIMEs, July 10, 2008,
B. Reynolds, Indian Tax Authority Focuses on Cross-BorderDeals, 19 INT'L TAx Rev. 7 (2008).
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taxing rights; and on the other, judicial activism and international divergence,
perhaps leading to a more equitable balance of taxing rights. Clearly the approach
taken will affect, positively or negatively, the attitude of MNEs and other
investors towards future investment in India.

11.

THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE

A. Indian Economic Expansion, Tax Treaties and the Role ofMauritius
Since the early 1990s India has undergone ambitious reforms to liberate its
economy, including the relaxation of exchange controls and restrictions on foreign
ownership. This reform process has generated substantial foreign direct investment
[hereinafter "FDI"] in India by MNEs based in the United States [hereinafter "US"],
Europe, Japan and elsewhere. Net FDI in India has been estimated at US$ 4.7 billion
for the 2005-06 fiscal year, increasing to US$ 8.5 billion for the 2006/07 fiscal year.16
Gross investment inflows were much higher. The growth of multinational activity
in India has inevitably been accompanied by mergers, acquisitions, divestments
and other corporate restructurings, giving rise to complex tax and commercial
issues." How these tax issues are resolved depends, of course, on the domestic tax
laws of India, the domestic tax laws of the investor's State of residence, and the
provisions of any tax treaty between the two States.
The States providing the greatest amount of FDI into India in recent years
are, beginning with the largest source, Mauritius, the US and the United Kingdom
[hereinafter "UK"]." The primacy in this list of the relatively small island nation
of Mauritius is initially surprising. The position is explained by a series of features
that make Mauritius an attractive jurisdiction in which to establish holding
companies or other investment vehicles. First, the relaxation of India's foreign
investment restrictions in the early 1990s coincided with the development of the
Mauritian Financial Services Centre. Under this regime a company resident in
Mauritius is subject to a very low rate of tax on investment income and faces no
Mauritian capital gains tax, while its foreign shareholders face no Mauritian
withholding tax on dividends or interest paid by the company. Second, the IndiaMauritius DTC is one of the most generous of India's tax treaties in allocating tax
jurisdiction to the resident/home State. The advantages include: (a) a reduction of
withholding tax on dividend payments made by an Indian company in which a
Mauritian company is a shareholder, from 20% to 5% where the shareholder has
16

128 (2006-2007), MINISTRY OF
126 (2007-2008), OFFICE OF INDUSTRIES,
Competitive Conditions for Foreign Direct Investment in India 1-1, 2-1 (USITC Staff
Research Study 30, 2007).
See generally K. Dalal, InternationalRestructurings: Tax Consequences for Operations in
India, 53 BULL. INT'L FISCAL Doc. 560 (1999).
USITC, supra note 16, at 1-2, 2-11.
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, ECONOMIC SURVEY
FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, ECONOMIC SURVEY

"
"
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a participating interest; (b) a reduction of withholding tax on royalty payments
made by an Indian company to a Mauritian company, from 20% to 15%;
(c) the absence of a "feesfor technical services" article, which exists in various Indian
tax treaties; and (d) a complete exemption from capital gains tax on the alienation
by a Mauritian company of property in India, unless the property is immovable
property or is part of a permanent establishment that the Mauritian company
has in India.19 In this last respect the treaty is more akin to the OECD model tax
convention [hereinafter the "OECD Model" ]20 than are most other Indian tax
treaties, which tend to incorporate elements of the United Nations model tax
convention [hereinafter the "UN Model"].21 In broad terms, most of India's tax
treaties place a greater emphasis on source-based taxation, reflecting India's
22
historic position as a net importer of capital and technology.
The India-Mauritius DTC has been controversial in India for some time.
Some feel that the treaty has been manipulated by third-country residents to
23
route investments into India and to extract income at reduced or nil rates of tax.
The treaty has even been used by Indian residents setting up wholly-owned
companies in Mauritius to route investments into India, a scheme known as
"round tripping"or "mirroring".Nevertheless, the Central Government has continued

to support the India-Mauritius DTC and has yet to renegotiate it. Official
pronouncements regarding the application of the treaty have served to induce
foreign investors to establish residence in Mauritius, rather than deterring such
behaviour. In 1994, the Finance Ministry issued a circular 24 which clarified that
capital gains, derived by a Mauritius resident from the transfer of shares of an
Indian company, are only taxable under Mauritian tax law (which, in effect, means
such gains will not be taxed). In 2000, apparently in response to investor concerns
"
20

21

Article 13 of the India-Mauritius DTC. This provision is discussed in more detail in
section III.C below.
OECD ComvrrEE ON FIScAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL
(Paris, 2008). The OECD Model is accompanied by detailed commentary
[hereinafter "OECD Commentary"], which includes reservations expressed by
various OECD member and non-member States. India is not a member of the
OECD but was granted observer status in 2006. The extent of the country's
engagement with the OECD is apparent from the inclusion of India's views in the
current OECD Commentary.

U.N. Articles of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed
and Developing Countries,U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102 (2001). The UN Model is accompanied
by detailed Commentary [hereinafter "UN Commentary"], building upon and
sometimes differing from the OECD Commentary.

22

23
24

For a detailed comparison see S. Rao & R. Nayak, India and International Community
Split over Treaty, 19 INT'L TAX REV. 32 (2008).
USITC, supra note 16, at 2-13, 6-6.
CIRCULAR 682, Clarificationregarding agreement for avoidance of double taxation with
Mauritius (30 March, 1994), available at www.incometaxindia.gov.in (last visited
November, 2008).

95

Vol. 21 (1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2009

that the ITD was disputing the "beneficial ownership" of dividends paid to Mauritian
investment vehicles, the Finance Ministry issued a further circular.25 It stated
that a tax residency certificate issued by the Mauritius government constituted
"sufficient evidence" of the tax residence of a company in Mauritius as well as the
beneficial ownership of dividends which the Mauritian company received from
Indian companies. It also reiterated that capital gains derived by a Mauritius
resident from the transfer of shares of an Indian company are not taxable in
India.
A host of challenges to the validity and impact of the 2000 circular were
made via public interest litigation in the case of Union of India v. Azadi Bachao
Andolan.2 6 In that decision, the Supreme Court of India made it abundantly clear
that the circular constituted a legitimate exercise of the Central Government's
authority under the Act. The Court also made wide-ranging comments on the
validity of international tax planning, which are certain to be highly influential
in the current dispute.

B. Description of the Vodafone Essar Transaction
Given the obvious advantages of structuring foreign investments in India
through a Mauritian holding entity, it is not surprising that the controlling interest
in TelCo was held by HTI in this manner. Nor is it surprising that Vodafone's
acquisition of that controlling interest, which was the largest foreign direct
investment in India to date,27 maintains the Mauritius connection. Before
considering the merits of the challenges mounted by the ITD, it is helpful to examine
the mechanics of the acquisition.
The transaction has been casually described by some commentators as a
sale of shares in TelCo from HTI, based in Hong Kong, to Vodafone, based in the
UK. This description is merely an approximation as it condenses the relevant
corporate structures and legal relationships. Unfortunately, the details of the
actual arrangement are somewhat obscure. Documents available from HTI
indicate that the overall transaction was agreed upon in February, 2007 and
completed in May, 2007.28 The author understands from these documents, from
the Petition Judgment, and from parties familiar with the case, that the formal
25

26
27

28

CIRCULAR 789, Clarificationregarding taxation of income from dividends and capital gains
under the Indo-Mauritius Double Tax Avoidance Convention (DTAC) (13 April, 2000),
available at www.incometaxindia.gov.in/ (last visited November, 2008).
[2003] 263 1. T. R. 706 [S. C.], reversing [2002] 256 I. T. R. 563 [Delhi High Court].
A. Heyward et al., BrandIndia - Where Next? A Panel Discussion, 20 J.APPLIED CORP. FIN.
8, 16 (2008).
H. T. I. press releases are available at http://www.htil.com.hk/eng/media/press.htm.
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transaction involved Vodafone International Holdings BV [hereinafter "Vodafone
BV"], a Dutch subsidiary of Vodafone, acquiring all of the shares of CGP
Investments (Holdings) Ltd [hereinafter "CGP"], a Cayman Islands subsidiary of
HTI, from HTI for $11 billion cash. CGP in turn owned directly or indirectly one
or more entities based in Mauritius, which in turn owned 52% of TelCo plus a
further 15% interest in the form of options. 29 The remaining 33% of TelCo was and
remains owned by the India-based Essar Group. It should also be noted that,
while HTI has its headquarters in Hong Kong, it is incorporated (and presumably
resident) in the Cayman Islands, being a subsidiary of Hong-Kong based
Hutchison Whampoa Limited. It is plain from the above description of the
arrangement that the formal capital gain arose where the transferred shares
were located, which was Cayman, or where the vendor was located, which was
either Hong Kong or Cayman."0 On either view of the transaction there would
seem to be no taxable nexus with India or even with Mauritius.
The ITD nevertheless advances the bold proposition that the gain on the
disposition of the CGP shares by HTI was within India's domestic tax jurisdiction.
It argues that the profit on the transaction - approximately US$ 9 billion - was
chargeable to tax in the amount of US$ 2 billion. Although the primary liability
would rest with the vendor, the ITD argues that Vodafone BV is jointly liable for
failing to withhold tax from the consideration paid to the vendor.31 It further
argues that TelCo itself may legitimately be assessed for Vodafone's purported
tax liability as a "representativeassessee" based in India.3 2

C. Summary of the Main Issues in Dispute"
The case presented to the High Court involves several issues and it is not
feasible to address all of them here. As mentioned above, the central question is
whether India's jurisdiction to tax can be interpreted in such a way that the gain
on the disposition by HTI, which was formally an alienation of shares situated
offshore, is nonetheless taxable as a gain arising or accruing from the underlying
shares or assets in India. Doing so would seem to require an expansive reading of

31

The indirect acquisition of the additional 15% of TelCo was subject to dispute
because of Indian regulatory restrictions on foreign ownership. The acquisition
was eventually approved by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board.
If the vendor were resident in Hong Kong, then, in the absence of a tax treaty
between Hong Kong and Cayman, both States might seek to tax the gain. The
transaction was of course structured this way because neither of those jurisdictions
taxes capital gains.
Income Tax Act, 1961, § 195, 200 [hereinafter "ACT"].

32

ACT,§160-163.

29

so

33

The Petition Judgment, supra note 12 sets out in great detail the positions of the
parties with respect to the issues summarized here.
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the already broad ambit of section 9 of the Act, disregarding the separate legal
personality of companies in a multinational corporate group. Even if it were
accepted as a matter of domestic law that section 9 applied, the Indian Courts
would next have to consider whether the deemed income of the enterprise would
be exempt from Indian taxation by virtue of the India-Mauritius DTC. That
determination would depend upon whether the treaty was considered to have
any relevance to the disposition by HTI and, assuming the treaty was relevant,
whether the benefits of the treaty should be denied in any event.
There are other supplementary issues that would need to be decided if
the Indian Courts concluded the transaction was taxable in India. One question is
whether Vodafone, as purchaser, should or should not be treated as a "person"
liable to withhold tax on payments to non-residents within the meaning of section
195 of the Act, given that Vodafone BV had no taxable presence in India." Another
question is the constitutional validity of a retroactive/retrospective amendment
to the Act, introduced by the February 2008 Budget, providing that a failure to
withhold tax at source by a withholding agent may be subject to penalties and
interest." While these questions are fascinating in their own right, they are
unlikely to require answers given the analysis of the substantive issues below.

III.

WHAT IS THE APPARENT EXTENT OF INDIA'S JURISDICTION
TO TAX CAPITAL GAINS?

A. GeneralComments on Jurisdictionto Tax
As a matter of public international law, each country has the sovereign
right to legislate within its territorial jurisdiction. A pivotal aspect of legislative
sovereignty is the jurisdiction to tax.36 There is a difference of academic opinion
regarding the power of States to legislate extraterritorially when there is no right
to enforcement. One school of thought maintains that a State's right to tax is in
3
3

36

See, Clark v. Oceanic Contractors Inc, [1983] 2 A. C. 130 (H. L.).
The combined effect of sections 195, 200, 201 and 221 of the Act is that a person who
fails to withhold or remit tax from payments to non-residents is deemed an 'assessee
in default' and may face penalties and interest on amounts not withheld or remitted.
Section 201 was amended by the Finance Act, 2008, retroactive to June 2002. The
amendment could thus affect Vodafone and TelCo notwithstanding that the
acquisition occurred in May 2007. For a discussion of challenges to retroactive tax
legislation in the UK and Canada see, G. T. Loomer, Taxing Out of Time: Parliamentary
Supremacy and Retroactive Tax Legislation, B. T. R. 64 (2006).
THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAWOF TAxATION: TExTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 1-9 (A. H. Qureshi
ed., Graham &Trotman, 1994), R. S. J.MARTHA, THE JURISDICTION TO TAX IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 12-18 (Kluwer, 1989).
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principle unlimited: a State may enact legislation taxing the income of persons
having no connection to the country, whether or not such a law could be enforced
as a practical matter." In the UK, India and other Commonwealth countries, this
view of tax jurisdiction is buttressed by the constitutional argument that
extraterritorial lawmaking of any nature is within Parliamentary competence.
The other school asserts that purporting to tax the foreign income of non-residents
is not only impractical, but contrary to international law." While this matter
remains contentious, both theories accept that a State enjoys a right to tax where
there exist legally relevant "connecting factors" with that State. The generally
accepted connecting factors, and thus the accepted bases for tax jurisdiction, are
residence and source. Income tax legislation usually reflects these limits even if as
a matter of constitutional theory it need not do so. Lord Herschell famously
summarized the extent of UK tax jurisdiction in the following terms, "The Income

Tax Acts, however, themselves impose a territoriallimit, eitherthatfrom which the taxable
income is derived must be situatein the UnitedKingdom or the personwhose income is to be
taxed must be resident there" .39
India is like most States in that it exercises both residence-based and
source-based taxation in respect of income, including capital gains. For residents
of India, section 4 of the Act, in conjunction with subsection 5(1), provides that a
person's total income subject to tax includes all income derived from any source
which is received or deemed to be received in India by him, which accrues or
arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to him in India, or which accrues or arises to
him outside India. Subsection 5(2) provides that the total income of a person who
is non-resident includes all income derived from any source which is received or
deemed to be received in India by the non-resident, or which accrues or arises or
is deemed to accrue or arise to the non-resident in India. Thus, a gain that "arises
in" India from a transfer of capital property, and which "arises to" a non-resident,
is included in the non-resident's Indian income and taxed accordingly.4 0 The nonresident may also face taxation in the residence/home State in respect of the same
3

38

9
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Wurzel, supra note 3, A. KNECHTLE, BASIC PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL FISCAL LAw 37-41
(Kluwer, 1979), A. H. Qureshi, The Freedom of a State to Legislate in FiscalMatters under
GeneralInternationalLaw, 41 BULL. INT'L FISCAL Doc 14 (1987).
A. R. Albrecht, The Taxation of Aliens under InternationalLaw, 29 B. Y. I. L. 145 (1952),
Avi-Yonah 2007, supra note 6. For a detailed discussion see Qureshi 1994, supra note
36, at 22-125.
Colquhoun v. Brooks, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 493, 504 (H. L.), approved in Westminster
Bank Executor and Trustee Co (Channel Islands) Ltd v. National Bank of Greece,
[1971] A. C. 945, 954 (H. L.). See also, Electronics Corporation of India Ltd v. C. I. T.
[1990], 183 I. T. R. 43, 52 [S. C.].
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capital gain, leading to double taxation. This problem may be alleviated by
unilateral relief in the domestic legislation of the residence/home State or, more
commonly, by the capital gains article of a tax treaty negotiated between the two
States."
The framework of section 5 of the Act seems workable until one begins to
explore the question of where capital gains or other income "arise" For many
forms of income the answer to that question will be far from obvious. In the
context of capital gains on company shares, the prevailing (yet arbitrary) rule is
that such gains "arise" in the country where the company is resident, regardless
of where the company or its operating subsidiaries carry on business. The critical
question in the Vodafone Essar dispute is whether India's source jurisdiction goes
further than this.

B. Deemed Income ofNon-Residents under Indian Domestic Law
1. Section 9 of the Act
As noted above, subsections 5(1) and 5(2) of the Act include in a person's
total income, all amounts deemed to be received by him in India or deemed to
accrue or arise to him in India. This brings into play section 9 of the Act, which
deems certain types of income to accrue or arise in India. Paragraph 9(l)(i) reads
as follows:
(1) The following incomes shall be deemed to accrue or arise in India:(i)

all income accruing or arising, whether directly or indirectly, through or
from any business connection in India, or through or from any property
in India, or through or from any asset or source of income in India, or
through the transfer of a capital asset situate in India.

Clause (a) of the first Explanation to this provision quite sensibly provides
that, where the operations of a business are carried out partly in India and partly
elsewhere, the income of the business deemed by section 9 to accrue or arise in
India is only such part of the income as is reasonably attributable to the operations
in India. The other clauses of the first Explanation are not relevant here.
There are two fundamental observations to make regarding the scope of
section 9. First, it is not contentious that the provision applies to both residents
and non-residents. Therefore non-residents, who are beyond Indian tax
jurisdiction in respect of income accruing or arising abroad, are chargeable under
subsection 5(2) in respect of income deemed by section 9 to accrue or arise in
India. Second, the term "deemed" creates a statutory fiction: it brings within the
scope of taxation income not actuallyarising in India but which is legally considered
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to have arisen in India.' It is said that the word "deemed" is apt to include the
obvious, the uncertain and the impossible.' Thus, section 9 enlarges India's tax
jurisdiction by deeming certain types of income which, in principle, would be
considered to arise elsewhere, to arise in India for tax purposes. The potentially
extraterritorial reach of this and other provisions of the Act do not render such
provisions unconstitutional."
One can imagine that the ITD might invoke section 9 to advance a number
of arguments that HTI's disposition of its controlling interest in TelCo was within
India's source jurisdiction. Specifically, it could allege that income was deemed to
accrue or arise to HTI in India by virtue of "the transfer of a capital asset situate in
India". A slightly more tenable argument would be that income was deemed to
accrue or arise to HTI in India through or from a "business connection" in India.
2. Transfer of a Capital Asset Situate in India
An argument under this branch of section 9 of the Act would begin from
the recognition that what occurred in the Vodafone Essar transaction was
indisputably a capital disposition rather than a transaction producing trading
income. HTI disposed of its ultimate controlling interest in a telecom enterprise,
while Vodafone BV acquired that controlling interest through an isolated
payment. There is no evidence that HTI was carrying on an active business of
buying and selling shares in telecom companies, as a securities dealer might do.
Although the legal distinction between capital and income can be vexing, it is
quite difficult to see how this transaction could be characterized as anything
other than a transaction on capital account, from both the vendor's perspective
and the purchaser's perspective. This should be true even if one ignores the separate
identity of companies in the corporate group and postulates that HTI "sold the

telecom business" to Vodafone.
The recognition that this was a capital transaction inevitably leads to
difficulties in maintaining that the transaction was taxable in accordance with
this branch of section 9. The provision deems income to accrue or arise through
"the transferof a capitalasset situate in India". The expression "transfer ofproperty" may
42

4

4

C. I. T./C. E. P. T. v. Bhogilal Laherchand, [1954] 25 I. T. R. 50 [S. C.], C. I. T. v. R. D.
Aggarwal & Co, [1965156 1.T. R. 20 [S. C.], N. A. PALKHIVALA &B.A. PALKHIVALA, KANGA
AND PALKHIVALA'S LAW AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAX 256 (811edn., Tripathi, 1990).
C. I. T. v. Vina, [1965] 58 I. T. R. 100 [Gujarat High Court], citing Public Trustee v.
I. R. C., [1960] A. C. 398, 407 (H. L.).
A. W. Wadia v. C. I. T., [1949] 17 1. T. R. 63 [Privy Council], Abdul Azeez v. C. I. T.,
[1958] 33 I. T. R. 154 [Madras High Court], Electronics Corporation of India Ltd v.
C. I. T. [1990] 183 1. T. R. 43, 52 [S. C.].
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be very broad, including voluntary and involuntary transfers as well as full and
partial transfers, yet in all cases it denotes the passing of rights in property from
one person to another. The legal form of the Vodafone Essar transaction was such
that there was no passing of rights in any capital asset situate in India. The assets
of TelCo were and continue to be owned by TelCo. The shares of TelCo were and
continue to be owned 67% by the Mauritian entities and 33% by the Essar Group.
Even the ownership of the Mauritian entities has not changed. Formally, the only
passing of rights from one person to another was in respect of the shares of CGP,
which are situated in the Cayman Islands, not India.
The only means of sustaining an argument based on this branch of section
9 is to pierce the corporate veil, ignoring the separate personality of the companies
in the HTI corporate group. Two variations seem possible. The Indian Courts
could adopt the position that, for tax purposes, one should ignore the separate
personality of all the intermediate holding entities and of TelCo itself. On this
basis one would posit that HTI disposed of telecom assets situated in India.
Maintaining such a view would be challenging to say the least; TelCo presumably
has paid income tax over the years as a company resident in India; and TelCo
presumably has distributed dividends on which its domestic shareholders have
paid tax and on which its Mauritian shareholders have suffered withholding
tax.45 A less extreme position would be to accept the corporate status of TelCo but
to ignore the separate personality of all the intermediate companies, deeming
HTI to have disposed of shares of TelCo. On either view, there would be a notional
disposal by a non-resident of capital property situated in India, rendering the
gain taxable in India pursuant to sections 4, 5(2) and 9. This taxing right, if it
exists, would not be mitigated by treaty because there is no tax treaty between
India and the Cayman Islands.
Indian domestic law, like the law of many other States, contemplates the
disregard of corporate personality in various circumstances, including situations
involving aggressive tax avoidance.46 There will be no attempt to investigate or
reconcile those circumstances here, other than to say that the Act does not easily
lend itself to interpretations of international legal relationships that disregard
separate corporate personality. Among other things, the Act provides that "person"
includes a company," accepts that "company" includes any "any body corporate
4
46

4

Reduced to 5% pursuant to Article 10 of the India-Mauritius DTC.
S. R. Wadhwa & P. K. Sahu, Form and Substance in Tax Law 87a CDFI 337 (Int'1 Fiscal
Association Congress, India Branch Report, 2002), R. Jain, Conflicts in the Attribution
of Income to a Person, 92B CDFI 291 (Int'l Fiscal Association Congress, India Branch
Report, 2007).
ACT, § 2(31).
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incorporatedby or under the laws of a country outside India",48 and does not contain a
controlled foreign company [hereinafter "CFC"] regime. The Act seeks to
counteract international tax avoidance in certain specific situations 49 but contains
no general rule that would apply here. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in
Azadi Bachao Andolan, observed that, while Courts are empowered to pierce the
corporate veil when applying domestic law, such an approach "can hardly apply"
to entities resident in a State with which India has concluded a tax treaty.0
Whether the Indian Courts should, in the present case, retreat from a legalistic
approach for the purpose of determining the scope of the Act is discussed in
section IV below.
3. Business Connection in India
An alternative position would be to accept - or claim to accept - the
separate personality of all companies involved in the transaction, but argue that
deemed income arose directly or indirectly through or from a "business connection"
in India.
The term "business connection" has been described as "one of the most nebulous
and elastic terms used in this Act". 5 ' The term was not defined prior to April, 2004. The
Finance Act, 2003 inserted two additional Explanations after the then existing
Explanation in section 9. The second Explanation, which is relevant for present
purposes, elaborates on the term "business connection" as follows:
For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that "business connection"
shall include any business activity carried out through a person who,
acting on behalf of the non-resident, (a)

has and habitually exercises in India, an authority to conclude contracts
on behalf of the non-resident, unless his activities are limited to the
purchase of goods or merchandise for the non-resident; or

(b) has no such authority, but habitually maintains in India a stock of goods
or merchandise from which he regularly delivers goods or merchandise
on behalf of the non-resident; or
(c)

4
4

so
51

habitually secures orders in India, mainly or wholly for the non-resident
or for that non-resident and other non-residents controlling, controlled
by, or subject to the same common control, as that non-resident ...

ACT, § 2(17).
ACT, § 92-92F, 93.
Azadi Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, [2003] 263 I. T. R. 706 [S. C.] at I[ 116.
PALKHIVALA, supra note 42, at 18.
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Put simply, business connection includes any integral business activity
carried out through a dependent agent in India. The second Explanation goes on
to exclude most independent agents acting in the ordinary course of business
from the scope of business connection, provided such an agent does not work
"mainly or wholly" on behalf of the non-resident or on behalf of the non-resident
and certain associated non-residents. The cumulative effect of the second
Explanation bears some resemblance to paragraphs 5 and 7 of Article 5 of the UN
Model, listing certain agency activities which do or do not constitute a permanent
establishment. For example, paragraphs 5(4)(a), 5(4)(b) and 5(5) of the IndiaMauritius DTC, which seem to be based on paragraphs 5(5)(a), 5(5)(b) and 5(7) of
the UN Model, illustrate the similarity between the business connection rules
and relevant treaty provisions.
The above-mentioned Explanation does not purport to define business
connection exhaustively, thus one must consider how the term is more generally
understood in Indian law. The essential features of a business connection appear
to be the following: a real and intimate relation must exist between the
business activities carried on beyond India and the business activities carried
on within India; that relation must somehow contribute to the earning of
income by the non-resident in the overall business; and there must be a course
of dealing or continuity of relationship, rather than an isolated transaction,
between the person in India who helps earn the profits and the non-resident
who realizes those profits.5 2 The concept of "business connection" is thus similar
to, but wider than, the treaty concept of permanent establishment. The crucial
point is that both concepts are founded upon an underlying premise that the
business of the non-resident is carried on partly in the source/host country,
whether through an agent or otherwise. In other words, the determination
whether the local activities of the business meet the threshold of business
connection or permanent establishment is subsequent to the question whether a
unitary business exists.
Is it correct to aggregate the economic activities of a multinational corporate
group and treat them as a single business? Again we come up against the legal
principle that the business of a company cannot automatically be subsumed
within the business of a controlling shareholder, as each is a separate juridical
person. This principle is recognized in the treaty context by paragraph 5(7) of the
OECD Model and paragraph 5(8) of the UN Model, dealing with permanent
establishments. Paragraph 5(6) of the India-Mauritius DTC is typical:
52

Anglo-French Textile Co. Ltd. v. C. I. T., [1953] 23 I. T. R. 101 [S. C.], C. I. T. v. R. D.
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The fact that a company, which is a resident of a Contracting State, controls
or is controlled by a company which is a resident of the other Contracting
State, or which carries on business in that other Contracting State
(whether through a permanent establishment or otherwise) shall not, of
itself, constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.
The relevant part of the OECD Commentary, which is reiterated in the UN
Commentary, states that the substance of the above provision is generally
accepted, as it stems from the principle that a subsidiary company constitutes an
independent legal entity. The Commentaries state that even the fact that a
subsidiary's business is managed by the parent company "does not constitute the

subsidiarycompany a permanentestablishmentof the parentcompany"." It is recognized, of
course, that a subsidiary can constitute a permanent establishment of its parent
company according to the same conditions stipulated with respect to unrelated
enterprises. For example, a subsidiary would be considered a permanent
establishment of its parent (or of another related company) if it was a dependent
agent of that company which had and habitually exercised authority to conclude
contracts in that company's name.
The same logic would seem to apply in the context of Indian domestic law;
if an Indian subsidiary acted as a dependent agent of its parent in the course of
the parent's business, a business connection would exist in accordance with section
9. The general principle of separate corporate personality nevertheless retains its
force. In the absence of some unitary business carried on by the parent and the
subsidiary, there appears to be no basis on which to characterize an Indian
subsidiary or its activities as a business connection of the parent. In the present
case, it is difficult to see how the business of TelCo, namely the provision of
telecommunications services to Indian customers, is intimately related to the
business of the Mauritian holding entities, which presumably consists of holding
shares (and possibly carrying out other investment or treasury functions). The
only way to reach the alternative conclusion would be to disregard the separate
corporate personality of the various entities in the group, effectively treating
TelCo as a branch of the non-resident enterprise. Whether the Indian Courts
should adopt that approach is discussed in section IV below.
One further point is worth noting with respect to section 9 of the Act. Even
if the Indian Courts were to view TelCo or its activities as a business connection
in relation to HTI, it is difficult to see how the profit on the disposition of HTI's
interest could be described as trading income arising "through orfrom" that business
connection. The profit would surely constitute a gain arising from the alienation
O. E. C. D. COMMEMPARY, Article 5 1 40, U. N. COMMENTARY, Article 5 1 32.
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of the entire business connection. The deemed profit would thus represent a capital
receipt rather than trading income. Accordingly, in the author's view, an argument
based on the "business connection" element of section 9 would not be not
substantially different from an argument that deemed income arose through the
transfer of a capital asset situate in India. The success of either variation of the
argument depends on the Courts' willingness to disregard the separate existence
of non-resident corporations and thereby expand India's source jurisdiction under
the Act.

C. Potential Application ofthe India-Mauritius DTC
If the Indian Courts were to accept that deemed income arose to HTI
pursuant to subsection 5(2) and section 9 of the Act, the next consideration might
be how to classify that income for tax treaty purposes. It is not evident that this
would be a consideration because, if the entire HTI enterprise were treated as a
single economic unit (disregarding the Cayman and Mauritian entities), there
would be no applicable tax treaty to consider.5 Yet, if the conclusion were reached,
contrary to the suggestions made in section III.B above, that the corporate
structure could be respected while at the same time deeming income to arise
through or from a business connection in India, the effect of the India-Mauritius
DTC would have to be addressed. This would be necessary because, as in other
countries, Indian tax treaties have priority over Indian domestic tax law.
1. Treatment of Deemed Income under the Treaty
It has been held that section 9 of the Act does not characterize or alter the
nature of the relevant income for tax treaty purposes." Presumably, deemed
income would retain its underlying character, meaning that deemed income from
business activity would be classified as business profits under Article 7, deemed
royalty income would be classified as royalties under Article 12, deemed income
from capital dispositions would be classified as capital gains under Article 13,
and so on for the other named income types. Where the nature of the income was
uncertain it would likely fall within Article 22 - 'Other Income'

5
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It is noteworthy that this issue is not mentioned in the Petition Judgment.
This principle is recognized in various cases, including Azadi Bachao Andolan,
[2003] 263 I. T. R. 706 [S. C.] and C. I. T. v. PVAL Kulandagan Chettiar, [2004] 267 I. T.
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treaty applies. This means that the Act does not apply to such an assessee in other
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It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, if the India-Mauritius DTC were
applicable to the disposition by HTI, the only appropriate treaty article would be
Article 13. One arrives at this conclusion primarily by recognizing that the
underlying character of the income in question, whether deemed to arise through
the transfer of a capital asset situate in India or through a business connection in
India, is that of a capital receipt. Even if the underlying nature of the deemed
income were considered ambiguous, reflecting elements of both capital gain and
business profits, one would have to consider paragraph 6 of Article 7, which

provides: "Where profits include items of income which are dealt with separatelyin other
Articles of this Convention, then the provisions of those Articles shall not be affected by the
provisions of this Article" What this means is that Articles which deal expressly
with specific types of income, such as Article 13, have priority over the business
profits Article in the case of overlap.5 7 The contrary argument - that the deemed
income represents profits of a Mauritian enterprise carrying on business in India
through a permanent establishment (Article 7) or represents other income that is
effectively connected with such permanent establishment (Article 22) - requires
one to postulate that the Mauritian enterprise "carries on business" in India through
a permanent establishment. As discussed above with respect to the meaning of
business connection, that hypothesis involves disregarding the separate
personality of the relevant companies and treating them as operating a unitary
business, contrary to paragraph 6 of Article 5. Surely it is untenable in the current
dispute to ignore the separate existence of TelCo while respecting the existence of
the Cayman and Mauritian entities. Yet, if the personhood of a Mauritian entity is
ignored, it cannot be a Mauritius resident entitled to treaty benefits, in which
case the India-Mauritius DTC becomes wholly irrelevant. All of this suggests
that the only potentially applicable Article is Article 13.
Simplifying somewhat, Article 13 of the India-Mauritius DTC grants
jurisdiction to the source/host State in respect of gains from the alienation of
immoveable property situated in the host State, gains from the alienation of
moveable property that is part of the business property of a permanent
establishment in the host State, and gains from the alienation of such a permanent
establishment" (with the standard exclusion for ships and aircraft operated in
international traffic). Paragraph 4 of Article 13 provides that gains derived by a
resident of a contracting State from the alienation of any other property shall be
taxable only in the residence State. Notably, the India-Mauritius DTC does not
5

0. E. C. D. COMMENTARY, Article 7 T 59-62; U. N. COMMENTARY, Article 7 24.
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An argument that any deemed income in this case represents a gain from the
alienation of a permanent establishment (1 13(2)) would be plagued by the same
problems noted previously: it necessitates disregarding the separate personality
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grant jurisdiction to the host State in respect of gains from shares in a company
is
which
resident in the host State, even where the value of such shares is derived
principally from immoveable property or other specified assets situated in the
host country.
This is unlike the UN Model and various other DTCs to which India is a
party. In most of India's tax treaties, a non-resident alienator of shares of an
Indian company could be subject to tax in India. The provisions often contain
some variation of the following language:'
Gains from the alienation of shares of the capital stock of a company
the property of which consists directly or indirectly principally of
immovable property situated in a Contracting State may be taxed
in that State.
Gains from the alienation of shares other than those mentioned in
[the paragraph above] representing a participation of at least 10%
in a company which is a resident of a Contracting State may be
taxed in that Contracting State.
Some treaties negotiated by India are even broader, allowing both
contracting States to tax gains from the alienation of any property other than
ships and aircraft operated in international traffic. 0 Under any of these treaties a
disposition by a non-resident of shares of an Indian company would be taxable
in India, limited in some cases to participating shareholdings.
This is in stark contrast to the India-Mauritius DTC. Article 13 of this treaty
ensures that capital gains derived by a Mauritius resident from the transfer of
shares of an Indian company are taxable only in Mauritius, as confirmed by the
government circulars issued in 1994 and 2000.61 A similar approach is taken in
India's tax treaty with Cyprus.' Each of these treaties reflects an exclusive
allocation of tax jurisdiction to the shareholder's residence State in respect of
capital gains on the transfer of shares. Source jurisdiction in respect of such gains,

9

60

61
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E.g. India-France Income and Capital Tax Treaty, India-Fr., 1992, Article 14 4-5;
India-Japan Income Tax Treaty, India-Japan, 1989 (as amended by 2006 Protocol),
Article 13 3.
E.g. India-United States Income Tax Treaty, India-U.S., 1989, Article 13; India-United
Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, India-U.K., 1993, Article 14; India-Canada Income
and Capital Tax Treaty, India-Can., 1996, Article 13 ' 2.
Supra notes 24 and 25.
India-Cyprus Income and Capital Tax Treaty, India-Cyprus, 1994, Article 14.
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even if it exists under domestic law, is eliminated by the treaty.
2. Denial of Treaty Benefits
There is a corollary issue that might arise in the course of the Vodafone Essar
dispute, depending upon how the transaction is ultimately characterized. Assuming
that deemed income is considered to have arisen under section 9 of the Act and that
such income would, in principle, be classified as a gain in accordance with Article 13
of the India-Mauritius DTC, the ITD could assert that the benefit of the treaty should
be denied in any event. The arguments advanced by the ITD in this regard would
undoubtedly resemble arguments that have been made by various tax administrations
around the world in response to perceived "treaty abuse" The challenges faced by
any tax administration are delineating which arrangements are abusive and
responding to perceived abuses without flouting the tax treaty in question.
As with other international treaties, a tax treaty reflects a balance of
advantages that is agreed to by the contracting States when the treaty is negotiated.
There are two principal purposes of tax treaties. The first is the reduction or
elimination of double taxation on transnational trade and investment; the second is
the prevention of tax evasion through an open exchange of information between the
contracting States.' Treaty abuse, and in particular "treaty shopping", is considered
to occur where the balance inherent in a treaty is undermined by persons who are
not resident in either contracting State accessing treaty benefits.
In 1987, the OECD published an influential report [hereinafter "OECD
Conduit Report"] which addressed the exploitation of tax treaties by a person
"acting through a legal entity createdin a State with the main or sole purpose ofobtaining
treaty benefits which would not be availabledirectly to such person".6 The OECD suggested
that treaty shopping should be discouraged because it violates reciprocity between
the contracting States, it can result in transnational income being subject to
"inadequate taxation", and it destroys the incentive for countries to negotiate and
conclude new treaties.' The UN, in 1988, published its own report on treaty
shopping [hereinafter "UN Treaty Shopping Report"], in which the term "abuse of
6
6

P. BAKER,

DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONs B.06-B.12 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2007),O. E. C. D.
COMMENTARY, Article 1 J17.
0. E. C. D. COMMITTEE ON FIsCAL AFFAIRS, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of
EVASION: FouR RELATED STUDIES 88
(0. E. C. D., 1987). The key points from this report are reiterated in the 0. E. C. D.
Commentary, especially at Article 1 111-21.
Id., at 90.
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tax treaties" was defined loosely as "the use of tax treatiesby persons the treaties were not
designed to benefit, in orderto derivebenefits the treaties were not designedto give them".66 The
authors admit that this definition begs a number of questions, notably: can we
identify the persons whom a tax treaty is designed to benefit? This report differs
from the OECD Conduit Report in that it recognizes there may be advantages to
allowing enterprises to structure their affairs so as to take advantage of tax
treaties. For example, developing countries that are keen to attract inward
investment may actively desire that dividends or interest paid to a recipient in a
treaty jurisdiction be subject to low or no withholding tax, even if the recipient is
a holding company for shareholders based elsewhere. 7
On comparing the OECD Conduit Report and the UN Conduit Report it
becomes evident that verbs such as "abuse" and "exploit" when applied to tax treaties
express value judgements - they are words of conclusion rather than analysis. A
prominent US commentator has stated that "abuse" is a heavily loaded term:
Not only is it derogatory; it implies that the proper use of tax
treaties can be identified. Yet differences over precisely that point
lie at the heart of the current discussion. Because the term suggests
what is being discussed is a point of common understanding and
agreement, when plainly it is not, the usefulness of the term is
questionable.6 8
Assuming that it is possible to identify situations of tax treaty abuse, the
next question is how to counteract it. This might be done through purposive
interpretation of the relevant treaty provisions, invocation of inherent treaty
anti-abuse principles or application of domestic anti-avoidance rules.69 A variety
of approaches have been used to determine whether an intermediate entity is the
67
68

Id., at 6-7.
H. D. Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 763,
766 (1983). For further discussion see, S. VAN WEECHEL, THE IMPROPER USE OF TAX TREATIES:
WrrH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED STATES (Kluwer Law
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International, 1998).
0. E. C. D. COMMENTARY, Article 1 19.1-22.2.
0. E. C. D. COMMENTARY, Article 10 1 12-12.1 and Article 11 9-10. Two of the most
important recent cases are Indofood International Finance Ltd. v. JP Morgan
Chase Bank, [2006] S. T. C. 1195 (Eng C. A.) (concluding that a proposed Netherlands
financing intermediary would not, according to Indonesian law, be the beneficial
owner of interest payments under Article 11 of the Indonesia-Netherlands tax
treaty) and Prevost Car Inc v. Canada, 2008 T. C. C. 231 (Tax Ct. of Can.) (concluding

that a duly constituted Netherlands holding company would, according to Canadian
and Dutch law, be the beneficial owner of dividend payments under Article 10 of
the Canada-Netherlands tax treaty). For further discussion of this issue see, J. D. B.

Oliver et. al., Beneficial Ownershipand the 0. E. C. D. Model, B. T. R. 27 [2001].
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"beneficial owner" of passive income streams (usually dividends or interest) and
therefore entitled to reduced withholding tax rates in respect of such payments.0
Decisions in this area are of little assistance in the present dispute as Article 13 of
the India-Mauritius DTC, like the capital gains articles of the 0. E. C. D. Model and
UN Model, does not incorporate any requirement as to beneficial ownership.
Therefore, it appears that an Indian Court could deny the benefit of Article
13 to an intermediate entity based in Mauritius only if it held that the entity was
not a "person" or a "resident" of Mauritius within the scope of Article 1, perhaps
because it was not actually resident there or was not "liable to taxation" on the
basis of its residence. It is evident from the circulars mentioned previously that
the Central Government does not wish to entertain such assertions.7 1 More
importantly, the Supreme Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan made it plain that such
assertions are not viable when applied to a company which is duly constituted
and resident in Mauritius according to Mauritian law.72 An alternative approach
would be for an Indian Court to fashion some judicial anti-avoidance rule or
principle which achieved the same effect, preventing a Mauritian entity from
accessing the treaty where the entity was seen as a mere shell for shareholders
based elsewhere. It is very doubtful that this approach would be adopted given
the observations in Azadi Bachao Andolan. The important point is that either of
these approaches throws us back to the central issue addressed earlier, namely,
whether the separate existence of non-resident companies should be disregarded
in order to preserve or expand India's source jurisdiction.

IV.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE EXTENT OF INDIA'S JURISDICTION
TO TAX CAPITAL GAINS?

A. Legal Limitations v. Policy Options
The discussion above has demonstrated that section 9 of the Act is expansive
but not limitless, that Article 7 of the India-Mauritius DTC (if relevant) is probably
not applicable in the face of Article 13, and that the Courts' authority to deny the
benefit of Article 13 is not unfettered. Throughout the discussion it has been
submitted that any approach which the ITD might employ to assert jurisdiction
over the gain arising to HTI displays a common theme. This theme is that India is
justified, when delimiting its jurisdiction as a source State, to aggregate the distinct
71
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entities or activities of a multinational corporate group and treat them as a single
enterprise or business.' Unfortunately for the ITD, each of the approaches
addressed above urges the Courts to interpret and apply the Act or the IndiaMauritius DTC in a way that cannot legally be sustained. What the ITD is
effectively asking for is a change in India's tax policy and, indeed, a change in the
international tax system. It is useful, briefly, to investigate the nature of the change
or changes that the ITD appears to be seeking and to consider how feasible such
changes might be.

B. Worldwide FormularyApportionment as a Policy Option
The international tax principles or norms which are reflected in the Act
and in the India-Mauritius DTC, and which will likely prevent the arguments of
the ITD from succeeding in this dispute, are the principles of corporate residence
(and residence-based taxation), permanent establishment (and source-based
taxation) and separate entity accounting. Underlying these principles or norms is
the recognition that a company is a legal person independent of its shareholders.74
Corporate residence in the UK, India and most Commonwealth countries
is determined based on place of incorporation, location of central management
and control, or both. It is well-known that residence thus defined, is one of the
key legal concepts that facilitate international tax avoidance. A well-advised MNE
is able to establish offshore residence of its subsidiaries with ease, thus enabling
it to shift domestic profits to or retain foreign profits in convenient jurisdictions.
This practice is particularly well-suited to reducing or eliminating taxation of
capital gains.' Nevertheless, most States' domestic tax systems place great
emphasis on residence, while treaties based on the OECD Model and (to a lesser
extent) the UN Model allocate jurisdiction over various types of income to the
State of residence.
The current understanding of source is little better. It has long been
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recognized that a given item of income may arise from related activities carried
on in different countries, making it tremendously difficult to determine what or
where the "source" of that income is. Some have argued that the concept of income
is "not susceptibleto characterizationas to sourceat all" and that any rules which purport
to assign income to a geographic location are necessarily arbitrary." The treaty
concept of permanent establishment may be a reasonable guideline for taxing
economic activity in a source/host State, yet it currently operates within the
restricted context of corporate residence and separate entity accounting."
Tax scholars have argued for decades that prevailing international tax
principles, including residence-based taxation, source-based taxation and
separate entity accounting, are unsatisfactory Commentators typically argue in
favour of greater source-based taxation or advocate abandonment of these
principles in favour of a radically new international tax system, a system which
they believe will amplify the tax jurisdiction of developing States, and thus
enhance global equity. Among other authors, Graetz has denounced the current
system of international taxation as being founded upon and characterized by
"inadequateprinciples,outdatedconcepts, and unsatisfactorypolicies".79 Professor Vogel
vigorously asserted that the prevailing system of residence-based taxation with
credits for foreign income is inequitable, is adverse to "economic reason", and
amounts to "fiscal imperialism".8 " The general reporters at the 2005 congress of the
International Fiscal Association repeatedly criticized the "immobilism" of the
prevailing international tax regime, which in their view exhibits an unacceptable
bias towards developed countries.8 ' In recognition of these shortcomings, a vast
body of literature has arisen arguing that arbitrary residence and source rules
should be abandoned in favour of some system of global income apportionment
based on multilateral negotiation and agreement.82
What must be remembered is that these are policy changes recommended
by international tax commentators. Their recommendations are aimed at
"

78
7

so
81
82

H. J.Ault & D. F. Bradford, Taxing InternationalIncome: An Analysis of the US System
and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 14, 31 (A. Razin & J.
Slemrod ed., Chicago, 1990).
0. E. C. D. COMMENTARY, Article 7 '1 14-26.
Supra note 2.
K. Vogel, The Search for Compatible Tax Systems, in TAX POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 85-86 (H. Stein ed., 1988). For more detail see, supra note 2.
IFA 2005 Congress, supra note 8.
Some of the best analyses are: P. B. Musgrave, International Tax Base Division and the
MultinationalCorporation,27 PuB. FIN. 394 (1972); Picciorro 1992, supranote 4, at chapters
8-9; and J Li, Global Profit Split: An Evolutionary Approach to InternationalIncome
Allocation, 50 CAN. TAx J. 823 (2002).
113

Vol. 21 (1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2009

legislators and international organizations, including the OECD and UN. It would
be incredibly difficult for the legislature of a single country to impose these
changes unilaterally. More germane to the present dispute, it would be impossible
for the judiciary of a single country to impose these changes through interpretation
of existing tax laws.
C. More Modest Policy Options
There are less radical policy options for improving the existing international
tax system, some of which could be implemented unilaterally by a State. These
options involve amending domestic rules or renegotiating treaty provisions that
define and allocate source-based and residence-based jurisdiction.
Various improvements to the allocation of source jurisdiction are possible,
including expanded formulations of the permanent establishment concept and
enhanced withholding taxes.' Many of India's tax treaties already provide
relatively low thresholds for finding that a foreign enterprise carries on business
in the host State through a permanent establishment. Further, some of its treaties
provide for enhanced host State jurisdiction with respect to gains on company
shares, as discussed above. India could renegotiate other tax treaties to achieve
similar allocations of jurisdiction, as it has done recently in its treaty with the
United Arab Emirates [hereinafter "UAE"]M and as other countries have done in
response to perceived treaty flaws." There are indications that India is
renegotiating its tax treaty with Cyprus and may be renegotiating its treaty
with Mauritius. If it wished to do so, India could even amend section 9 of the Act
to expressly deem income to accrue or arise in India where a gain is realized on
the transfer of an indirect shareholding in an Indian company. Such a rule would
of course be subject to applicable tax treaties.
There is also scope for improvement with respect to the concept of residence,
in both treaties and domestic law. Limitation on benefits provisions, like Article
24 of the treaty with the US and the recently adopted Article 29 of the treaty with
83
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the UAE, test the strength of the nexus between the person claiming treaty benefits
and the residence State in which he does so."6 A US-style limitation on benefits
article introduces more substantive restrictions on fiscal residence than exist
under most States' domestic laws: for example, such a provision may restrict
treaty benefits to companies that are ultimately controlled by individuals resident
in the other contracting State. The inclusion in treaties of limitation on benefits
provisions, or even the redefinition of "resident" within treaties, are probably the
most effective ways of preventing treaty shopping by residents of third States. In
the domestic law context, it might be desirable to implement a more substantive
formulation of corporate residence, although of course this would have no effect
on the laws of foreign States. A revised domestic residence formulation could be
based on location of effective management," location of controlling shareholders,
or other criteria indicating that productive human endeavours actually occur in
the company's State of residence."
A State can therefore explore a variety of methods for improving its system
for taxing international transactions, without having to wait for a globally
implemented solution. Yet, as with a multilateral solution, these are changes
that would have to be made by legislators and treaty negotiators rather than
judges. It is not possible for the judiciary of a State to impose such changes
through interpretation of tax laws based on current formulations of source
and residence. Nor is it desirable, having regard to legal certainty and
predictability, that the judiciary should attempt to do so through boundless
application of anti-avoidance rules.

V.

CONCLUSION

In Azadi Bachao Andolan the Supreme Court made the following comments
regarding the constraints imposed by the international tax system:
There are many principles in fiscal economy which, though at first
blush might appear to be evil, are tolerated in a developing
economy, in the interest of long term development. Deficit financing,
for example, is one; treaty shopping in our view, is another. Despite
the sound and fury of the respondents over the so called 'abuse' of
87
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'treaty shopping', perhaps, it may have been intended at the time
when Indo-Mauritius DTAC was entered into. Whether it should
continue, and, if so, for how long, is a matter which is best left to
the discretion of the executive as it is dependent upon several
economic and political considerations. This Court cannot judge
the legality of treaty shopping merely because one section of
thought considers it improper. A holistic view has to be taken to
adjudge what is perhaps regarded in contemporary thinking as a
necessary evil in a developing economy."
In the author's view, those observations are apposite, not only to treaty
shopping, but also to other phenomena that are endemic to the current
international tax regime, including the widespread use of tax haven holding
companies to avoid both residence and source taxation. The same observations
could also be expressed by developed countries, many of which struggle to deal
with tax avoidance in respect of both inbound and outbound investment. Any
State that respects prevailing international tax principles or norms, including
residence-based taxation, source-based taxation and separate entity accounting,
faces difficulties in ensuring that the incomes of MNEs are subject to what that
State views as an appropriate domestic tax burden. Nonetheless, a State does not
want its tax system to repudiate these principles for fear that it would damage
the State's investment climate.
It is perhaps unsurprising that tax administrations may take matters into
their own hands, zealously pursuing what they see as the State's fair share of tax
on international income. It is unfortunate that specific taxpayers, who have
arranged their international affairs in a manner that appears to be legally
permissible under prevailing tax rules, are driven to defend those rules in Court
at their own expense. The Vodafone Essar dispute is one example of this pattern.
In the dispute the ITD may make a variety of arguments under section 9 of the Act
and Articles 7 and 13 of the India-Mauritius DTC, all in an effort to achieve some
degree of taxation in respect of capital gains that largely derive - ultimately and
economically - from a profitable business in India. Yet any such argument must
be based on the proposition that separate corporate personality should be
disregarded, separate corporate residence should be ignored, and separate entity
accounting should be replaced. The ITD thus seeks to dispense with prevailing
norms of international taxation and to impose a form of worldwide unitary
taxation for MNEs operating in India. It is asking the Courts to do something
which they are not empowered to do; make tax policy changes for the betterment
of the country.
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